Mr. Chair,

Director General,

Distinguished Governors,

Ukraine takes note of the Director General’s latest report and thanks the Agency’s personnel deployed at Ukraine’s nuclear facilities for continuing their work under extremely difficult conditions.

As we approach next week’s General Conference, Russia’s continued disregard for the Agency’s principles and the decisions of its governing bodies, as well as its attempts to flood the Agency’s official communication channels with propaganda, demands a clear and consistent response from Member States.

The situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant must no longer be described as merely “fragile” or “precarious”. After more than four years of Russian occupation, Europe’s largest nuclear power plant is undergoing a slow but steady technical degradation.

The absence of a nuclear accident must not be mistaken for the presence of nuclear safety.

All six reactors remain in cold shutdown, but this does not suspend the laws of physics or stop equipment from ageing. Safety systems still require regular testing and maintenance. Pipes, valves, seals, electrical equipment and emergency systems still require qualified personnel, spare parts and proper regulatory oversight.

Established supply chains and regulatory arrangements have been disrupted. Temporary technical solutions are gradually becoming permanent operating conditions.

Previous Agency reports have already documented leaks, boric acid deposits, incomplete maintenance activities and restricted access to safety-related areas.

Increasing the water levels in the spent fuel pools may increase the time available before water begins to boil in the event of a prolonged loss of power and the exhaustion of diesel fuel. But let us be clear about what this means. The plant is being prepared for a scenario in which all external power is lost, diesel supplies are exhausted and normal cooling can no longer be maintained.

Why is the Russian occupation administration preparing for such a scenario now? Is Russia already preparing the occupied plant for the foreseeable consequences of yet another campaign of massive winter strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure? As was already announced by Putin.

 

Mr Chair,

Before Russia’s invasion, the plant had access to ten off-site power lines. Today, it depends on only one fragile 330-kilovolt line. Its main 750-kilovolt Dniprovska line has remained unavailable since March. Although part of the line was repaired during an Agency-facilitated window in June, it could not be re-energized because an associated Ukrainian substation had been severely damaged by Russian attacks.

According to Energoatom, the plant has suffered 15 complete losses of off-site power this year alone, bringing the total since Russia’s full-scale invasion to 27. Repeated dependence on emergency diesel generators demonstrates how severely the conditions for nuclear safety have deteriorated under Russian occupation.

Of particular concern is that the Russian occupation administration continues to mislead the ISAMZ team. Ukraine has recorded false and mutually inconsistent information provided to the Agency regarding the amount of diesel fuel available at the site and the timing of its replenishment. The repeated claim that the plant has more than ten days of diesel fuel cannot be treated as verified merely because it is communicated by the occupiers.

Mr Chair,

The military threat surrounding the Zaporizhzhia plant has also evolved.

The war is increasingly being conducted by unmanned systems. Ukraine continues to record the deployment of Russian drone operators, control antennas, relay equipment, observation positions and supporting infrastructure in occupied Enerhodar and in the immediate vicinity of the nuclear power plant.

This is not an incidental military presence. Moscow is integrating a protected nuclear facility into its drone warfare infrastructure. It uses the plant and the surrounding area as a military shield, conducts operations from locations where it expects no response, and then attempts to blame Ukraine for the consequences of the military activity that Russia itself has brought to the site.

Reports of drone incidents near the dry spent fuel storage facility warrant particular attention. Military activity near facilities containing spent nuclear fuel creates an unacceptable risk. The Agency must have prompt and unrestricted access to establish the circumstances and assess any consequences for nuclear safety and security.

The danger extends far beyond the plant perimeter. Russian drone operators have turned attacks against civilians in the Kherson region into what has become known as a “human safari”.

Earlier this month, two women humanitarian workers supported by UNFPA and IOM were injured when their vehicle was struck by a drone in the Kherson region. This attack recalls the deeply disturbing incident of December 2024, when a kamikaze drone struck and severely damaged a clearly marked IAEA vehicle during a rotation to the Zaporizhzhia plant.

The driver of another Agency vehicle saw the drone approach from behind and strike the car. The attack took place on Ukrainian-controlled territory, approximately eight kilometres from the frontline.

These incidents must not be considered in isolation. When drones are used to hunt civilians and humanitarian workers, while drone units and related infrastructure are positioned near the Zaporizhzhia plant, the similarity of the operational pattern cannot simply be ignored.

We call on the Secretariat to pay particular attention to any indication of the presence of drone operators, control antennas, launch sites, repair facilities, relay systems and electronic warfare equipment at the plant and in occupied Enerhodar.

 

Mr Chair,

Ukraine has consistently supported the Director General’s Five Concrete Principles for the protection of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. They remain fully relevant and must continue to be strictly observed.

At the same time, the character of warfare and the technologies used around nuclear facilities have evolved significantly since the Five Principles were presented to the United Nations Security Council back in 2023. Unmanned systems now represent one of the most serious and rapidly developing threats to nuclear safety and security.

The deployment of drone operators, control antennas, relay equipment, electronic warfare systems and facilities used for the launch, storage or repair of military drones at or near a nuclear power plant is clearly incompatible with the purpose and spirit of the Five Concrete Principles.

That is why believe that the time has come to consider how their practical application could more explicitly reflect the realities of drone warfare. Such an update would not alter their core substance. On the contrary, it would reinforce their continued relevance and ensure that they remain capable of addressing the threats currently emerging around the Zaporizhzhia plant.

We trust that the Director General will give due consideration to this evolving challenge and to the need to further develop the practical application of the Five Concrete Principles.

We further call upon the Board to firmly demand that Russia remove its military personnel, drone units, weapons and other military equipment from the Zaporizhzhia plant and occupied Enerhodar; grant the Agency full and unrestricted access; and cease its attacks against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure essential for nuclear safety.

Mr Chair,

Ukraine values the continued presence of the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission at the Zaporizhzhia plant. Even under its current constraints, the mission provides a minimum degree of international observation at a nuclear facility occupied by Russian armed forces.

But presence without access risks becoming observation without verification.

Agency experts must receive timely and unrestricted access to all areas relevant to nuclear safety and security, including reactor and turbine buildings, rooftops, open switchyards, the cooling pond area, storage facilities and the plant perimeter. Delayed access allows military equipment to be relocated and evidence to be removed before the mission arrives.

The Secretariat should report clearly whenever access is denied, delayed or restricted. It should also distinguish consistently between facts independently verified by the mission and claims communicated by the Russian occupation administration.

The fact that Agency experts hear explosions or observe drones does not, in itself, establish who is responsible. Russia must not be allowed to use the Agency’s presence to lend credibility to accusations that its experts have not independently verified.

A recent example is Russia’s communication circulated as INFCIRC/1415 on 8 September. It accuses Ukraine of attacking a market in Enerhodar on 6 September and presents photographs as supporting evidence. Yet at least two of those photographs had already been published years earlier in entirely different contexts.

This example is particularly telling in light of Russia’s repeated accusations against Ukraine, which the Agency has not independently verified. As the Director General’s report itself records, ISAMZ access to sites of alleged incidents was significantly delayed, and debris had already been removed before experts could inspect it. Russia presents its accusations immediately, but allows access only after evidence has been cleared away.

This gives the Board every reason to question the credibility of Russia’s claims. The absence of independent verification must not become an opportunity to pass off allegations as established facts. Nor does an INFCIRC number make recycled disinformation credible.

Russia is also no longer able to ensure the safe and predictable rotation of Agency personnel. Recent ISAMZ rotations have been repeatedly postponed, including because the security situation created by Russia’s own war has made travel to the ZNPP unsafe.

A rotation mechanism that depends on the aggressor State for transport, security guarantees and access cannot be regarded as reliable or sustainable. These repeated postponements demonstrate that Russia cannot guarantee either the safety or the continuity of the Agency’s presence at the plant.

Mr Chair,

Behind every reference to pressure on the personnel of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant are real people and real families.

Earlier this year, Vladyslav Lavryk came to Vienna and appealed directly to IAEA Member States to help secure the release of his father, Ruslan Lavryk, an engineer of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. Ruslan was unlawfully detained, subjected to torture and sentenced by a Russian occupation “court” to sixteen years in a strict-regime penal colony on fabricated charges.

This summer, Vladyslav’s mother, Inna Lavryk, was killed in a Russian drone strike near her home.

Vladyslav has now lost his mother, while his father remains in a Russian prison. This is the real human meaning of Russia’s occupation of the Zaporizhzhia plant.

Ukraine calls upon the Director General and all members of the Board to use every available channel to secure the immediate and unconditional release of Ruslan Lavryk and all other unlawfully detained current and former employees of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

Mr Chair,

Every nuclear safety risk described today has the same root cause: Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. There can be no lasting solution to these risks without addressing their source? As was stressed by the many delegations today.

Ukraine has repeatedly proposed different formats to stop the war and advance a comprehensive, just and lasting peace. President Zelenskyy has expressed his readiness to engage in direct negotiations with the Kremlin dictator. Yet these proposals have been consistently rejected by Moscow.

The reason is increasingly clear: for the current Russian regime, the continuation of the war has become a condition for the survival of the system it has built.

The Board of Governors is not a forum for negotiating peace. But every Governor sitting in this room represents a government with political, diplomatic or economic influence. That influence does not end at the doors of this Boardroom.

We therefore call upon all members of the Board to use every available lever to compel Russia to abandon its obstruction and to engage in genuine negotiations. Those who maintain direct channels with Moscow or possess particular political and economic influence bear a special responsibility.

It is time to bring Russia to the negotiating table and make clear that its strategy of occupation, nuclear coercion and endless war will not succeed.

Ending Russian aggression is not only the path to peace. It is also the most effective and reliable measure for restoring nuclear safety and security in Ukraine.

Thank you, Mr Chair.