Mr. Chair,

Ukraine thanks the Director General for his reports and the Secretariat for its continued professional work under exceptionally difficult circumstances.

The latest report confirms that Iran has still not taken the steps required to remedy the serious safeguards concerns identified by the Agency and by this Board.

During the reporting period, Iran did not provide the Agency with information on the safeguards status of its declared nuclear facilities and associated nuclear material and did not provide access necessary for verification, apart from limited activities at Bushehr. As a result, the Agency remains unable to verify the status of declared nuclear material or to conclude that there has been no diversion from peaceful nuclear activities.

This is not a new problem, nor can it be treated as a temporary technical difficulty.

The Board has already found that Iran’s repeated failures to provide full and timely cooperation concerning undeclared nuclear material and activities constitute non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement. It has also found, consistent with Article 19 of that Agreement, that the Agency is unable to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material.

Regrettably, Iran has not remedied that non-compliance.

Of particular concern is Iran’s continued failure to account for its enriched uranium inventory. The Agency has now been without continuity of knowledge for more than one year regarding previously declared inventories of low- and highly enriched uranium, including uranium enriched up to 60 per cent U-235. The Director General explicitly identifies the lack of information about this material, and the lack of access to verify it, as a matter of proliferation concern requiring the utmost urgency.

The situation at the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant raises additional concerns. Since Iran declared this facility in June 2025, the Agency has not been granted the access necessary to establish its safeguards status, determine whether it contains nuclear material, or verify whether enrichment activities have taken place there.

Nor has Iran engaged with the Agency during this reporting period on the unresolved safeguards issues related to undeclared nuclear material and activities. The Agency therefore still cannot determine what happened to nuclear material identified at undeclared locations and remains unable to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.

Mr Chair,

Iran also continues not to implement modified Code 3.1 and has not provisionally applied its Additional Protocol since February 2021. These are not secondary matters. They directly restrict the Agency’s ability to obtain timely information and to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

Ukraine recalls that resolution GOV/2026/40 required Iran, without delay, to provide complete information on nuclear material inventories and design information and to grant the Agency all access required to verify that information. The report before us demonstrates that these requirements remain unfulfilled.

Ukraine reiterates that nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes must never be attacked. At the same time, military circumstances cannot be invoked to suspend safeguards obligations. As the Director General has made clear, implementation of an NPT Safeguards Agreement cannot be suspended under any circumstances.

We therefore call on Iran to cease obstructing effective verification, provide the Agency with all requested information and access, resolve the outstanding safeguards issues, and fully implement the decisions of this Board.

Continued non-compliance and continued refusal to cooperate cannot become the new normal.

I thank you, Mr. Chair.