Mr. President, 

Director General, 

Excellencies,

Distinguished Delegates, 

It is an honour to address this General Conference at a time when a growing number of countries are turning to nuclear energy to strengthen their energy security, reinforce economic resilience and advance the transition towards a low-carbon future.

Ukraine firmly shares this vision and remains committed to the peaceful, safe and responsible development of nuclear energy.

We also have valuable practical experience to contribute. Over the past Ukraine diversified its nuclear fuel supply, accumulated considerable expertise in qualifying components for use in reactors, and progressively integrated its nuclear sector into trusted international supply chains.

Even amid Russia’s full-scale war, Ukraine continues to look ahead. Nuclear energy supplies millions of Ukrainian homes, sustains our economy and will remain a cornerstone of our recovery.

This would not be possible without Ukrainian operators, engineers, emergency workers and regulators, who have kept our nuclear facilities safe and fulfilled Ukraine’s safeguards obligations under circumstances no nuclear professional should ever be required to face.

This April, on the fortieth anniversary of the Chornobyl disaster, Ukraine convened the Conference on Recovery and Nuclear Safety. We turned remembrance into action by launching the process of restoring the New Safe Confinement damaged by the Russian drone strike of 14 Feb25.

Mr. President,

Russia answered these efforts with another attack. On 7 June 2026, a Russian drone struck the Centralized Spent Fuel Storage Facility in the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone and caused significant damage to its fuel reception building.

No radiological release occurred. But the absence of radiological consequences does not make such an attack acceptable. It means only that, once again, the worst was narrowly avoided. Nuclear safety cannot depend on where, within a nuclear site, a drone happens to explode.

This is the pattern Ukraine confronts: we repair, Russia strikes; we reinforce safety, Russia creates new risks; we build international cooperation, RU tests how much danger the world is prepared to normalize.

The same pattern now threatens Ukraine's energy system ahead of another winter. On 1 September, less than two weeks before this Conference, Vladimir Putin publicly stated that he had ordered Russian forces to prepare and carry out massive strikes against Ukraine's energy facilities. This was not an accidental remark. It was the public announcement of a policy.

Days earlier, RU Parliamentarians called for Ukrainian cities to be bombed to demoralize the population, declared that Russia should use tactical nuclear weapons to force Ukraine to capitulate.

When such rhetoric is broadcast by the aggressor state's political establishment while its president announces a new campaign against the power grid, the international community should listen carefully - and act before words become the next wave of missiles and drones.

For this Agency, the implication is direct. A nuclear power plant does not end at its perimeter. Its safety depends on transmission lines, substations and stable off-site power. 

Ukrainian substations involved in transmitting electricity from nuclear power plants have already come under more than one hundred and fifty Russian attacks. Every such strike erodes defence-in-depth. Every damaged line reduces safety margins.

Every blackout places additional strain on emergency systems that were never designed to serve as a recurring substitute for reliable off-site power. Ukrainian resilience has prevented catastrophe.

Mr. President,

The occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains the most dangerous expression of this policy. Europe's largest nuclear power plant is still controlled by Russian troops.

Its connection to off-site power remains fragile. Maintenance activities remain constrained. Cooling and water availability require constant attention.

The Agency's experts continue to face restrictions on access and information. Ukrainian personnel have been subjected to intimidation, coercion, abduction and unlawful detention.

Russia’s military use of the site also continues to evolve. Ukraine’s competent authorities continue to record military activity at and around the ZNPP, including the deployment of equipment and personnel supporting drone operations.

Restrictions imposed by the occupying power may prevent the Agency from verifying such activities, but they cannot be treated as evidence that those activities are not taking place.

The Director General’s five concrete principles must remain fit for purpose in the age of drone warfare.

They should be interpreted and applied to prohibit the storage or launch of unmanned aerial vehicles from the site, as well as the deployment at or around the ZNPP of antennas, equipment or personnel supporting their navigation or control. A nuclear power plant must never be used as a shield, launch site or command centre for military operations.

The Director General’s latest report confirms this reality. But let us be clear: this is not a collection of unrelated technical problems. They all have one cause — Russia’s military occupation.A reactor was never designed to operate behind a front line, under armed control, separated from its lawful operator and regulator. No amount of monitoring can make such conditions normal.

Ukraine values the continuous presence of IAEA experts at all five Ukrainian nuclear sites and the Agency's missions to critical electrical substations. This presence is indispensable for independent observation and international awareness. But monitoring occupation cannot become the end state. An international mission cannot replace Ukrainian sovereignty, the Ukrainian regulator or the legitimate operator.

The only sustainable solution is the complete withdrawal of Russian military and other unauthorized personnel and equipment, and the return of the ZNPP to the full sovereign control of Ukraine.

Any attempt to restart a reactor under occupation, under Russian licensing and without authorization by Ukraine’s lawful regulator would be illegal, technically irresponsible and politically provocative.

Russia must also immediately release all Ukrainian ZNPP personnel it unlawfully detains. Nuclear professionals are not bargaining chips. They must be able to perform their safety duties and make decisions without fear, coercion or pressure.

Mr. President,

The occupation has a military structure, but it also has corporate architecture. Rosatom entered the ZNPP behind Russian troops and has helped transform its armed seizure into a system of unlawful administrative control.

It has supported an illegal management structure, imposed Russian contracts, sought to displace the lawful Ukrainian workforce, and advanced Russian licensing and restart plans for reactors taken by force. This is not neutral technical assistance. It is the institutionalization and attempted legitimization of occupation.

Ukraine therefore calls on Member States to impose sanctions on Rosatom, its leadership and the entities directly involved at the occupied plant; to stop new financing and contracts that sustain Russia's nuclear revenues; and to reduce dependence on Russian nuclear services in a safe and orderly manner. Dependence cannot be a permanent exemption from accountability.

Mr. President,

Throughout the full-scale war, Ukraine has continued to fulfil its obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.

The Agency has continued its verification activities and has found no indication, giving rise to proliferation concern. Ukraine remains faithful to the rules while Russia tries to weaponize the facilities and infrastructure those rules were designed to protect.

The UA Armed Forces are not attacking

Later during this Conference, each delegation will have an opportunity to defend those rules by supporting the resolution on nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine.

This is not a procedural vote, and it is not a geopolitical ritual. Supporting the resolution does not obstruct peace. It defends the minimum conditions without which no peace can be safe, credible or sustainable.

The question before this Conference is larger than Ukraine. 

Can military force create a new nuclear operator?

Can an aggressor seize a nuclear power plant, install its state corporation, manufacture licences and wait for the world to accept the result through fatigue?

If the world allows the answer to be yes, every nuclear facility in a future conflict will become a potential trophy of war.

Our answer must be no. Aggression creates no rights. Occupation creates no operator. A license issued by the occupying power creates no legitimacy. And commercial dependence creates no immunity from sanctions.

Ukraine wants to rebuild the New Safe Confinement. We will defend our energy system through the coming winter. We will protect and modernize our nuclear sector. And we will restore the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant under Ukrainian law and to the highest international standards.

But this future also depends on the choices made in this hall. Atoms for Peace is not merely a motto. It is a line the international community must defend.

On one side of that line stands nuclear energy governed by law, responsibility and cooperation. On the other stand reactors under occupation, power grids under fire and nuclear threats broadcast on state television. Neutrality between them is not balance. It is permission.

Support the resolution. Protect Ukraine’s nuclear and energy infrastructure.

Sanction Rosatom and the entities helping to legitimize the occupation. Demand Russia’s withdrawal from the ZNPP. Let the seventieth General Conference be remembered not for managing nuclear danger, but for refusing to normalize its cause.

Thank you.