Mr. Chair,

Director General,

Distinguished Governors,

Ukraine takes note of the Director General’s report on nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine and thanks the Secretariat for its continued work under conditions created not by nature, not by accident, and not by any abstract “situation”, but by Russia’s war of aggression and its illegal occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

This agenda item is not abstract for Ukraine. It is about the protection of nuclear power plants in a country defending itself against a full-scale war of aggression. It is also about whether the international community is prepared to defend a simple principle: peaceful nuclear power plants and the infrastructure essential for their safety must never be transformed into instruments of war, coercion, blackmail or propaganda.

This year, Ukraine marked the fortieth anniversary of the Chornobyl disaster. In Kyiv, commemorative events were held to honour the victims, the liquidators and all those whose lives were forever changed by 26 April 1986. Ukraine is grateful to Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi for his personal participation in these events and for his continued support to Ukraine.

On that solemn anniversary, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Director General Grossi took part in the opening of the renewed permanent exhibition at the National Chornobyl Museum. It was an act of remembrance and responsibility — a reminder of why the international nuclear safety and security regime exists.

Less than a month later, Russia devastated this museum during its massive attack against Kyiv. A place dedicated to the memory and lessons of Chornobyl was attacked by the same state that today occupies the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and lectures this Board on nuclear safety. It would be absurd if it were not so dangerous.

The Chornobyl Exclusion Zone has also remained under threat. Fires caused by Russian drones and drone attacks in and around this sensitive area show how quickly conventional military action can create environmental, radiological and nuclear safety concerns. Even when radiation levels remain within normal limits, such incidents are unacceptable. Russia is not protecting the lessons of Chornobyl. Russia is attacking them — literally and politically.

Mr. Chair,

Let me now turn to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

The off-site power situation at the plant clearly demonstrates how Russia’s war and occupation have degraded the basic conditions for nuclear safety. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Zaporizhzhia NPP had several high-voltage lines providing the redundancy required for a nuclear facility of this scale. Today, that redundancy has been almost entirely destroyed.

Since 24 March 2026, the plant’s main 750 kV Dniprovska power line has been disconnected. As a result, the Zaporizhzhia NPP has been dependent on a single remaining external power line — the 330 kV Ferosplavna-1 line — for the electricity needed to maintain essential nuclear safety functions.

This is not a normal technical configuration. It is not a routine operational inconvenience. It is a direct degradation of defence-in-depth at Europe’s largest nuclear power plant. And it has a name: Russia’s war. Russia’s occupation. Russia’s military activity around the site. Russia’s attacks against energy infrastructure critical for nuclear safety.

Ukraine appreciates Director General Grossi’s personal engagement and efforts aimed at facilitating the restoration of power lines to the Zaporizhzhia NPP. These efforts are important. But the Board should not lose sight of the obvious: the Director General should not have to negotiate emergency arrangements for a Ukrainian nuclear power plant only because Russia first occupied it, then militarized it, then helped create the crisis, and now pretends to be indispensable in managing it.

This is the familiar Russian model: create the fire, block the exits, and then arrive at the Board dressed as the fire brigade.

In this context, Ukraine draws attention to the Russian strike against the Dniprovska substation — a critical 750 kV installation that is supposed to provide external power to the Zaporizhzhia NPP through the Dniprovska line. Such substations are part of the nuclear safety infrastructure.

So let us ask a simple question. How can Russia claim that it is ready to cooperate on restoring external power lines to the Zaporizhzhia NPP while attacking the very substations and infrastructure needed for that restoration? One cannot create a nuclear safety risk with one hand and present oneself as a responsible partner in resolving it with the other. This is not cooperation. This is a manufactured crisis with a Russian signature on every page.

Mr. Chair,

Today we have again heard Russia’s performance about alleged Ukrainian attacks against civilian infrastructure in Enerhodar and at the Zaporizhzhia NPP.

The script is painfully familiar. Before almost every important meeting of this Board, Moscow suddenly discovers a new “Ukrainian attack”, produces dramatic language, circulates selective fragments, and asks Member States to forget the central fact: Russia is the aggressor, Russia is the occupying power, and Russia is the source of the military risks at the Zaporizhzhia NPP.

Russia creates the danger. Russia restricts access. Russia controls the territory. Russia controls the information space. Russia removes inconvenient evidence. Russia delays independent verification. And then Russia comes to this Board and demands that its version be accepted as fact.

This is not evidence. This is theatre under occupation, performed for this Board with remarkable contempt for its intelligence.

Ukraine rejects Russia’s attempt to shift responsibility for the risks it has itself created at the plant. Without confirming, directly or indirectly, any of Russia’s allegations, let us ask a few simple questions.

Why do military vehicles explode in a city built for nuclear workers? Why are places of deployment of military personnel located in and around the civilian satellite city of a nuclear power plant? Why is equipment that can be used against peaceful Ukrainian cities placed near civilian nuclear infrastructure? Why does Russia bring war to Enerhodar and then pretend to be surprised that Enerhodar is no longer safe?

The answer is clear. The problem is not Enerhodar. The problem is Russia’s illegal military presence there. The problem is not Ukraine. The problem is Russia’s transformation of a civilian nuclear facility and its satellite city into elements of military infrastructure.

That is why Ukraine has consistently insisted that the only sustainable way to reduce risks is the demilitarization of the Zaporizhzhia NPP and its surrounding zone, including Enerhodar. Military personnel, military vehicles, electronic warfare systems, weapons, ammunition, firing positions and auxiliary military equipment must be removed from the plant and from its immediate environment.

 

Mr. Chair,

Ukraine categorically rejects the latest Russian accusations concerning an alleged strike by the Ukrainian Defence Forces against Unit 6 of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, including the turbine building area, as well as separate allegations concerning the plant’s transport workshop.

The Ukrainian Defence Forces do not strike nuclear power plants and do not create threats to nuclear safety. Our military acts in accordance with international humanitarian law and fully understands the consequences that any action against a nuclear power plant could have.

Russia, by contrast, has a credibility problem so severe that every new accusation from Moscow must be treated not as evidence, but as a lead for verification.

Let us look at what happened around the alleged incident near Unit 6. According to the information available to Ukraine, the event reportedly occurred around 14:00, at a time when the ISAMZ team was not on the site and was conducting a regular visit in Enerhodar. The team was accompanied and reachable. If an incident of such significance had genuinely occurred and if Russia had genuinely wanted immediate, independent verification, the logical step would have been simple: notify the Agency team immediately and provide access immediately.

Russia did the opposite.

The team requested immediate access to the location. Access was declined due to “security concerns”. Later, access was provided with a delay of almost twenty-four hours, to an area that had already been cleaned. Some traces were left behind, but not much. Even then, the team was not immediately able to observe the place from close distance. Closer observation reportedly came only later, from inside the turbine building.

This sequence speaks for itself. First Russia produces an accusation. Then Russia blocks immediate access. Then the site is cleaned. Then limited access is provided. Then Russia demands political conclusions.

This is not how nuclear safety works. This is how propaganda works.

If Russia had nothing to hide, why delay access? If the evidence was so clear, why was the area cleaned before the Agency could examine it properly? If Moscow wanted verification, why did it treat the Agency’s experts as an inconvenience? Russia wants the Board to accept a crime scene after the stage has been rearranged and the most inconvenient props have been removed.

Mr. Chair,

This is not an isolated case. It is a pattern.

A recent example is Russia’s story about the SODAR meteorological system at the External Radiation Control Laboratory. Moscow tried to present this as yet another “Ukrainian attack”. In reality, the equipment had already been shot through and rendered inoperable in 2022, during Russia’s own seizure of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, Enerhodar and the surrounding area. An Act of Technical Condition drawn up by ZNPP personnel on 8 April 2022 recorded bullet damage to SODAR components, holes in the antenna dish and electronic equipment casings, damage to antennas, cables and other parts of the system.

So what did Russia do in 2026? It took damage caused by its own forces in 2022, dusted it off, attached the word “Ukraine”, and tried to sell it to the Agency as a fresh Ukrainian attack.

This is not technical reporting. It is not even sophisticated disinformation. It is old damage repackaged as a new accusation.

This example matters far beyond one damaged piece of meteorological equipment. It shows the basic method of Russian communication in this Board: take the consequences of Russia’s own aggression, remove the context, attach the word “Ukraine”, circulate the result as if it were evidence, and hope nobody reads the technical record.

The same applies to the recent claims concerning the transport workshop. Russia speaks about buses and vehicles as if the Board were dealing with an ordinary civilian parking lot. But when ISAMZ visited the transportation department earlier, no buses remained in the large garage. What remained there was a blue armoured vehicle.

A nuclear power plant does not need armoured vehicles as a normal attribute of civilian operation. A civilian satellite city does not need military deployments. A transport workshop of a nuclear facility should not become part of a militarized logistics environment. If Russia insists on placing such objects in and around the plant, it should not come to this Board pretending to be shocked that the area has become unsafe.

This is the central absurdity of Russia’s position. It militarizes the plant and the city. It brings equipment, personnel and security structures into a civilian nuclear environment. It restricts access and controls information. Then it demands sympathy because a militarized environment is unsafe.

Mr. Chair,

 

There is another reason why Russia’s latest allegations must be treated with particular caution.

They were followed by open threats from Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, who spoke about possible “symmetrical strikes” against Ukrainian nuclear power plants, as well as nuclear power plants in NATO countries.

A senior Russian official is not simply commenting on nuclear safety. He is publicly discussing attacks against operating nuclear power plants. This is not concern for nuclear safety. This is nuclear intimidation in its most direct form.

The mask has slipped. First comes Russia’s accusation. Then comes Russia’s threat. Then Russia expects the world to treat its next escalation as “retaliation”. The Board should not be deceived by such a primitive sequence.

No state should be permitted to occupy another country’s nuclear power plant, fabricate accusations around it, restrict independent verification, and then use those accusations to threaten strikes against other nuclear power plants.

Mr. Chair,

Since 2022, this Board has been warned again and again that attacks against nuclear power plants and their supporting infrastructure cannot become part of the normal conduct of war. Yet Russia has continued to test this red line with impunity — at Zaporizhzhia, at Chornobyl, and through repeated attacks against the energy infrastructure supporting Rivne, Khmelnytskyy and South Ukraine NPPs.

Now this dangerous precedent is no longer confined to Ukraine. What some preferred to treat as “the Ukrainian case” is beginning to echo in other regions as well, including around the Barakah NPP. This is the price of hesitation. When attacks against nuclear power plants and their supporting infrastructure are not stopped in one place, they become thinkable elsewhere.

Russia has shown the world the method: occupy a nuclear power plant, militarize it, restrict verification, attack supporting infrastructure, fabricate accusations, and then lecture this Board on nuclear safety. This theatre must end.

The protection of nuclear safety, nuclear security and safeguards in Ukraine is no longer only a Ukrainian concern. It is a test of whether this Board is prepared to defend the nuclear order before the next dangerous precedent becomes the next dangerous reality.

Thank you, Mr Chair.