Mr. Chair,

At the outset, I express my delegation’s profound gratitude to Director General Rafael Grossi for his comprehensive introductory remarks and the relevant report.

The main conclusion is that the situation at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia NPP temporarily occupied by Russia is getting worse with all seven indispensable nuclear safety and security pillars and five principles on its protection being violated.

The full-scale Russian invasion in 2022, together with the occupation of Crimea and parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in 2014, highlighted significant issues with the effectiveness of the international law system, particularly in relation to the regulation of the protection of peaceful nuclear facilities, nuclear safety and security standards.

Over the past ten years, Russia has demonstrated that the international community's and international organisations' efforts to develop documents to regulate the protection of peaceful nuclear facilities, nuclear safety and security standards have been unsuccessful in preventing one country from implementing a barbaric plan to destroy a separate nation and its energy sector.

The lack of an adequate response, including the imposition of sanctions and restrictions on the rights and privileges granted by participation in the Agency, will encourage other countries to do the same in the future. This is contrary to the goal of promoting the development of nuclear energy.

Mr. Chair,

From the very first days of occupation, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant has been misused as a military base. The installation of anti-personnel mines and the occupation of plant facilities by military personnel pose a constant threat to the safety of the plant.

During March – May 2024, Russian combat UAVs at least six times attacked the ZNPP site near the nitrogen-oxygen station, as well as next to the reactor building of power unit No 6 and the training center. Moreover, Russian UAVs were used to attack peaceful Ukrainian cities and Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which damaged main and backup power lines putting the plant on the edge of blackout.

The IAEA mission continues to report on a near-daily basis about explosions, outgoing artillery and machine gun fire in close proximity to the plant site. The Agency’s team tried to obtain permission to access the incident sites and assess the damage. Still, it did not receive permission from the Russian occupation administration.

Converting a nuclear power plant into a military base poses numerous risks, including not only the immediate threat of radiation release, but also the possibility of nuclear materials being used to carry out terrorist acts. In addition, the presence of military units and munitions on the site increases the likelihood of accidental or intentional damage to critical infrastructure, which can have serious consequences. In such a case, the level of radiation contamination could even exceed the Chornobyl tragedy of 1986.

Despite the Board's call for Russia to cease all actions against the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, as well as for the urgent withdrawal of all unauthorised military and other unauthorised personnel from Ukraine's ZNPP and the immediate return of the plant to the full control of the competent Ukrainian authorities, Russia continues to cynically ignore the calls of the international community and common sense.

Despite the demands of four Board of Governors resolutions and the General Conference resolution, Russia continues to restrict the ability of the Agency experts deployed at the ZNPP. The ban on free movement and communication with the NPP personnel is based solely on the fear that the world will learn the real situation at the Russian-occupied Plant. These artificial restrictions have a direct impact on the Agency's ability to prevent a nuclear incident.

Distinguished Governors,

Russia and Rosatom continue attempts on illegal annexation of the Zaporizhzhia NPP by spreading lies and manipulations.

The information stated in Russia’s verbal notes to the IAEA Secretariat has nothing to do with reality. This especially relates to their claims on adequate equipment repairs, as well as staffing of the plant with competent and licensed personnel. None of this information could be verified or confirmed. The reality is opposite. 75 to 90 percent of overhauls of major safety equipment has not been performed. The number of plant staff dropped from almost 11 000 to below 3000 persons. About 2500 Ukrainian workers are denied in access to the site.

Mr. Chair,

Energy system of Ukraine is under constant missile and drone attacks of Russia.

Ukraine has lost almost 40% of its electricity generation due to these attacks. Russia destroyed or significantly damaged more than 80% of the thermal generation facilities in Ukraine. Today, Ukraine is left with only base generation – nuclear power with part of consumption covered thanks to renewables and electricity imports.

As Russia intensifies attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure there is a serious threat for the off-site power supply of Ukrainian nuclear power plants. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian NPPs have been in blackout for 12 times due to damages of substations and power lines caused by Russia’s shelling: ZNPP – 8 times, SUNPP– 2 times, RNPP – 1 time, KhNPP – 1 time.

Losing grid connection with NPPs means blackouts for millions of Ukrainians and increased risk of a potential nuclear and radiation accident.

Distinguished Governors,

Ukraine prioritizes the safety of its nuclear facilities. The first item on President Zelensky's peace formula is nuclear and radiation safety. We urge you to support our plan, which will be presented at the Global Summit in Switzerland. This plan aligns with international security principles and non-proliferation norms, reflecting our commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy worldwide.

It also reflects the common views of countries that are committed to the promotion and safe operation of nuclear energy.

Mr. Chair,

Today, Russia is not just a threat to nuclear safety in Ukraine. They are jeopardizing the global regime of nuclear safety, security and safeguards.

Russia acts against the principles of the IAEA Statute and has repeatedly failed to meet the calls of the IAEA Board of Governors on the Zaporizhzhia NPP.

Currently, the warranty period for the use of part of the nuclear fuel has expired at power units 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the ZNPP, which can potentially lead to a loss of  integrity of the fuel elements and, as a result, to a radiation accident. The nuclear fuel of the ZNPP is the property of Energoatom, and any actions of the Russian occupation administration with it at the Ukrainian nuclear power plant are illegal and violate international export control regulations. Only Ukrainian qualified and licensed staff can solve this technical problem.

 The seizure of both the facility and the nuclear material located on it jeopardizes the non-proliferation regime. This act of nuclear piracy by a nuclear-power raises severe concerns about the integrity of international safeguards.

Moreover, Russia’s deployment of nuclear weapons in a non-nuclear-weapon state Belarus is dangerous, unacceptable and should be considered a breach of its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is also no coincidence that Russia is actively cooperating with countries like Iran and North Korea, which are in non-compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation regime. 

Therefore, designation of Russia as the member of the IAEA Board of Governors would be a huge mistake. Russia has lost the right to be part of the civilized world promoting “atoms for peace” and a full-fledged member of international organizations. The aggressor state does not deserve a place in the Agency’s Board of Governors until it fully complies with the IAEA Statute and Board’s resolutions on the Zaporizhzhia NPP.

Mr. Chair,

I would also like to appeal to the representatives of those countries that are considering the possibility of developing their own nuclear programmes with the support of Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom and using loans from the Russian Federation. You should also think about the likely political, economic and military consequences for your countries due to cooperation with Russia.

The Russian Federation uses nuclear technologies as an instrument of political and economic pressure, as well as a possible means of military aggression. The use of Russian technology carries risks of loss of sovereignty and security, as Russia has repeatedly demonstrated its readiness to use its technology as a tool to achieve its own geopolitical goals.

The future of nuclear power depends on our shared responsibility and determination. We will not allow nuclear technology to be used for blackmail and aggression. We must do everything we can to protect the nuclear safety and security of Ukraine, Europe and the entire world.

I thank you, Mr. Chair.