Mr Chair,
Mr Executive Secretary,
Distinguished Delegates,

 

Ukraine reaffirms its full commitment to the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to the establishment of a reliable, objective and technically capable global verification regime.

The effectiveness of that regime ultimately depends on the ability of its monitoring facilities and National Data Centres to operate continuously, maintain reliable communications and provide high-quality data under all circumstances.

Ukraine’s national segment of the verification regime includes primary seismic station PS45 in Malyn and the Ukrainian National Data Centre, whose functions are performed by the Main Centre of Special Monitoring.

Both continue to operate under the conditions of Russia’s ongoing war of aggression, repeated missile and drone attacks, strikes against energy and civilian infrastructure, interference with satellite navigation, and persistent risks to personnel and equipment.

Despite this exceptionally difficult operating environment, the professionalism and dedication of Ukrainian specialists ensured data availability of 99.5 per cent for the International Monitoring System in 2025. This result demonstrates Ukraine’s continued contribution to the performance of the IMS and its determination to preserve the uninterrupted flow of objective monitoring data.

At the same time, the conditions in which PS45 and the National Data Centre operate continue to deteriorate.

In May and July 2026, the city of Malyn experienced several waves of Russian air attacks. Russia’s systematic strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, damage to communications, and deliberate interference with satellite navigation directly affect the power supply, timing systems and communication channels on which the continuous operation of PS45 and the National Data Centre depends.

Ukraine therefore attaches particular importance to the work of Working Group B on data availability, IMS sustainment, performance assessment and the capabilities of National Data Centres. The experience of maintaining the Ukrainian segment under such conditions provides practical lessons directly relevant to the resilience and sustainability of the future verification regime.

Mr Chair,

The verification system is also being developed in an increasingly dangerous international security environment.

The situation on the Korean Peninsula remains a matter of serious concern. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continues to advance its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in violation of relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. Its continued development of nuclear capabilities and associated delivery systems threatens regional and international security and undermines the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture.

These concerns are further aggravated by the expanding military cooperation between the DPRK and the Russian Federation.

Russia continues to use ballistic missiles supplied by the DPRK against Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure. International investigations have identified in Ukraine ballistic missiles of the Hwasong-11 series, also known as KN-23 and KN-24.

Most recently, at the end of July, Russia carried out another deadly strike using a missile identified by the Ukrainian authorities as being of North Korean origin.

The transfer and combat use of these missiles provide the DPRK with direct battlefield experience and technical feedback that may contribute to the further development and improvement of its missile capabilities.

Mr Chair,

The extraordinary conditions faced by Ukraine have also generated valuable technical experience that can contribute to the work of this Working Group.

Ukrainian specialists have maintained the uninterrupted operation of monitoring facilities during missile attacks and prolonged power disruptions, restored the operation of GPS receivers affected by hostile interference, optimized electricity consumption, established alternative communication channels and developed practical solutions to ensure continuity of data transmission.

These lessons are directly relevant to questions of IMS sustainment, station reliability, data availability and NDC preparedness.

Ukraine believes that this experience should be examined with a view to strengthening the resilience of the verification regime as a whole. It may also prove useful for monitoring facilities operating in other high-risk environments or facing prolonged disruptions of power supply, communications or satellite navigation.

Mr Chair,

The credibility of the International Monitoring System depends not only on the sensitivity and technological capabilities of its sensors. It also depends on the ability of every station to remain operational and to transmit reliable data when normal operating conditions are disrupted.

The experience of PS45 demonstrates that resilience must therefore remain an integral element of IMS sustainment and performance.

Protecting the operational continuity of PS45 is not solely a national matter for Ukraine. It contributes directly to preserving the integrity, availability and performance of a global verification system established collectively by all Signatory States.

Ukraine encourages Working Group B and the Provisional Technical Secretariat to draw practical conclusions from the experience of the Ukrainian segment and to consider how these lessons can be translated into technical measures aimed at strengthening the resilience, redundancy and continuity of the entire verification regime.

Thank you, Mr Chair.