Mr. Chair,

Executive Secretary,

Distinguished delegates,

Ukraine aligns itself with the statement delivered by Cyprus on behalf of the European Union and would like to add the following remarks in its national capacity.

Ukraine reaffirms its full support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, its universalization and entry into force, as well as for the work of the Preparatory Commission and the Provisional Technical Secretariat.

Nearly thirty years after the Treaty was opened for signature, the global norm against nuclear testing remains strong. However, it remains incomplete as long as the Treaty has not entered into force. Ukraine therefore calls on all States that have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty, in particular the remaining Annex 2, to do so without further delay and without conditions.

At a time of growing strategic instability, the international community needs legally binding commitments, reliable verification and responsible conduct by all States. Moratoria on nuclear test explosions are important, but they cannot replace the permanent legal effect of the Treaty’s entry into force.

Mr. Chair,

 Russia’s ongoing full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine continues to undermine international peace and security, including in the nuclear field. Russia’s irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, attempts to use nuclear risks and challenge nuclear safety culture as an instrument of coercion as well as decision to revoke its ratification of the CTBT are deeply troubling.

These actions run contrary to the object and purpose of the Treaty and weaken the international security architecture at a moment when it direly needs strengthening. Ukraine calls on the Russian Federation to return to responsible conduct, cease its aggression against Ukraine and refrain from any steps that could further undermine the global norm against nuclear testing.

Ukraine also remains deeply concerned about the DPRK’s continued nuclear and missile programmes. The DPRK remains the only country in the twenty-first century to have conducted nuclear test explosions. Any further nuclear test would constitute a direct challenge to the CTBT regime and to the international non-proliferation architecture. Ukraine calls on the DPRK to refrain from any further nuclear test and to abandon its nuclear weapons programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

Mr. Chair,

Ukraine’s support for the CTBT is demonstrated not only politically, but also practically. Ukraine hosts the certified primary seismic station PS45, located in the Malyn area, as well as the Ukrainian National Data Centre. These are important elements of the International Monitoring System and of the broader verification architecture established under the Treaty.

Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Zhytomyr region, including the Malyn area, has been repeatedly affected by Russian missile and drone attacks, air alerts, disruptions to energy infrastructure and other consequences of the war. In May 2026, during one of Russia’s large-scale drone attacks, explosions were reported in several locations of the Zhytomyr region, including Malyn.

Ukraine does not claim, without verified technical evidence, that station PS45 itself was directly targeted or damaged. At the same time, attacks on the city and the surrounding region where an IMS facility is located create real risks for personnel, power supply, communications, logistics and the continuity of data transmission. These risks are directly relevant to the resilience of the verification regime.

The International Monitoring System is not only a network of equipment. It depends on people, infrastructure, electricity, access, maintenance, secure communications and cooperation between the Provisional Technical Secretariat and station operators. The Ukrainian experience shows that the resilience of IMS facilities must be considered not only in technical, but also in security and crisis-management terms.

Ukraine appreciates the cooperation with the Provisional Technical Secretariat aimed at sustaining the operational capability of PS45 and other relevant national infrastructure. We are ready to continue sharing our experience in maintaining IMS-related capabilities under wartime conditions, including backup power, data continuity, staff safety and emergency coordination.

Mr. Chair,

Ukraine supports the continued strengthening of the International Monitoring System, the International Data Centre, and the preparedness of the Organization for future on-site inspections after the Treaty enters into force. The credibility of the CTBT depends on the technical reliability of its verification regime.

We therefore support a responsible approach to the Programme and Budget, with clear priority given to IMS sustainment, modernization of ageing equipment, cybersecurity, data availability, the Global Communications Infrastructure and capacity building for National Data Centres.

The CTBTO verification regime has already proven its value. It must not be allowed to degrade at a time when the international security environment requires more verification, more transparency and more trust.

Mr. Chair,

Ukraine, a State that voluntarily renounced the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal, has a particular moral and political standing in this discussion. Our position is clear: nuclear weapons must not be used for blackmail; nuclear risks must not be manipulated for political or military gain; and nuclear testing must never again be normalized.

We call on all States to preserve and strengthen the global norm against nuclear testing, support the work of the CTBTO, ensure the resilience of the verification regime and move decisively towards the entry into force of the Treaty.

Thank you, Mr Chair.