"Станції, які розміщені на шляху проходження потенційного радіоактивного шлейфу, повинні були здійснити заміри, необхідні для відновлення повної картини події, що відбулася 8 серпня 2019 року та була зафіксована іншими станціями Міжнародної системи моніторингу", – заявив Постійний представник.

Під час свого виступу Євгеній Цимбалюк підтвердив сталу позицію України щодо необхідності створення технологічно вдосконаленої системи верифікації, яка залишається необхідною умовою для надійного та ефективного моніторингу дотримання положень Договору навіть в умовах, коли ДВЗЯВ ще не набув чинності.

Було наголошено, що міжнародні зусилля із забезпечення колективної безпеки в значній мірі залежать від вступу цього Договору в дію.

 

Повний виступ Постійного представника України додається:

Statement by the Permanent Representative of Ukraine at the 53rd session of the CTBTO PrepCom

August 26, 2019

(agenda item 4 «General statements by delegations»)

Thank you, Chair.

Ukraine aligns itself with the statement delivered by Finland on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. In my national capacity I would like to present some additional points of Ukraine’s current position.

I would like to express my country’s full support for the work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat and all the efforts made by Executive Secretary and all the staff on the way of the entry into force of the Treaty.

Ukraine is confident that the universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains one of the key elements in construction of a reliable global security architecture.

In a few weeks the international community will mark already 23 years since the Treaty was open for signature and ratification. To this date
the CTBT remains a cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.

Though the CTBT has not yet come into force, building up a technologically advanced verification system remains a prerequisite for credible and effective monitoring of Treaty compliance.

Ukraine fully supports the Preparatory Commission’s efforts to enhance the operational readiness of the elements of the verification system, in particular the International Monitoring System (IMS) and the International Data Centre (IDC).

However, Ukraine is concerned of the lack of data availability from particular IMS stations after radioactive spike caused by the undefined event near Nyonoksa, Russia on August 8, 2019. These stations are located on the path of potential radioactive plume and, apparently, should have made measurements, necessary for obtaining the full picture of the event detected on August 8 by other types of IMS stations (3 seismic, 1 infrasound).

Moreover, this suspicious case has a significant impact on public opinion regarding the ability of International Monitoring Station to timely provide reliable and consistent information regarding the dubious events which may concern Treaty’s incompliance.

We highly appreciate the PTS job done to achieve maximum transparency and respond to growing public concerns over the impacts of this event. In particular, we thank Executive Secretary Dr Zerbo for providing valuable technical information regarding the state of affairs with regard to this event via the social media. Against this backdrop, we urge the PTS to provide Member States with additional details related to the incident. In particular the following:

1. First. On August 10, 2019 PTS confirmed an event coinciding with the August 8 explosion near Nyonoksa, Russia, detected at 4 IMS stations. We call on the PTS to shed some light on the results of the expert analysis of this event. In particular, with regard to its nature.
2. Second. On August 18, 2019, ten days after the incident, Executive Secretary by means of his official Twitter informed that I quote “technical problems experienced at two neighboring stations” end of quote. At the same time, relevant information analysis of the DOTS Database (Database of the Technical Secretariat) confirms that these stations showed almost 100% data availability for the period from August 2018 till August 8, 2019. Mentioned ‘technical problems’ occurred precisely on the date of the incident near Nyonoksa. In this regard, we would welcome the PTS explanation of the causes of such technical malfunction.
3. Third. After resuming operation, the PTS should have received restored data from mentioned stations. We request the PTS to share with States Parties the results of assessment of such information, especially in terms of confirming of its credibility.

Chair,

We are encouraged by the fact that to this date the Treaty was singed by 184 States and ratified by 168 of them, including 36 of the 44 States (Annex 2 States), whose ratification is needed for its entry into force.

At the same time, we are of the opinion, that in modern nuclear order the entry into force of the CTBT becomes more and more vital. Current international efforts to reduce the nuclear threat and collective security by large depend on the entry into force of the CTBT. This would lay a solid foundation for the foreseeable strategic relationship.

We are confident that every State Party and the world community will benefit from a transformation of the CTBT into the forceful international legal instrument. Therefore, Ukraine urges the remaining eight Annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Treaty without further delay and unconditionally. We reaffirm of the necessity for full compliance with the Treaty of all States Parties.

Thank you, Chair!