Mr. Chair,

Ukraine thanks the Director General for his report contained in document GOV/2026/46 and commends the Secretariat for the verification work that made this assessment possible. The report marks an important development in a safeguards case that has remained before the Board since 2011.

The Agency has now established that the former Syrian authorities failed to declare a nuclear reactor under construction at Dair Alzour, a related fuel fabrication plant and a location used to store nuclear fuel, uranium scrap and waste.

Verification activities conducted in August confirmed that the facility at Dair Alzour was a gas-cooled, graphite-moderated nuclear reactor that should have been declared. The Agency also verified approximately 73 tonnes of previously undeclared natural uranium metal, including around 55 tonnes in the form of 8,808 fuel rods.

Ukraine notes that the report recalls information indicating that the reactor had been built with the assistance of the DPRK. However, it does not clarify whether the Agency has been able to establish the full chain through which the reactor design, key components, materials and related fuel-fabrication capabilities were provided, including any direct or indirect involvement of other States, entities or third-country procurement networks.

To the extent relevant to the Agency’s mandate, we would appreciate the Secretariat’s assessment of whether these aspects have been examined and whether they point to any broader proliferation implications requiring continued attention.

Clarifying the external support and procurement channels behind this project is important not only for completing the historical record. It may also help identify networks and capabilities that could remain available for future proliferation activities. This case therefore underlines the need for continued close monitoring of the DPRK’s nuclear-related activities and for the full implementation and continued effectiveness of the measures established by the United Nations Security Council to prevent further proliferation.

The Agency’s findings further substantiate the Board’s 2011 determination of non-compliance and provide important clarity regarding the nature and scope of the undeclared nuclear activities of the former Syrian authorities. This historical record remains relevant for preserving the integrity of the international non-proliferation regime.

At the same time, Ukraine welcomes the transparency and cooperation demonstrated by the current Syrian authorities. We take positive note of the steps taken to provide the Agency with the necessary information and access, as well as of the fact that previously undeclared nuclear material has now been placed under Agency safeguards.

Ukraine also takes note of the Director General’s conclusion that the Agency has been able to clarify and resolve the outstanding safeguards issues previously reported to the Board. We encourage Syria to continue and reinforce its cooperation with the Agency, including with regard to the pending analytical results and any necessary follow-up activities. We also encourage Syria to conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol without further delay.

In light of the progress reflected in the Director General’s report, Ukraine supports an appropriate way forward by the Board that takes full account both of the 2011 finding of non-compliance and of the concrete remedial steps subsequently taken by Syria. We support continued reporting by the Director General on any further relevant developments and will continue to support the Agency’s independent, objective and technically grounded implementation of safeguards.

Thank you, Mr. Chair