Mr. President,

The issue of nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine has become a regular feature of every meeting of the Board of Governors and every General Conference of the IAEA since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the occupation of Ukrainian nuclear facilities, and the systematic attacks on them and on Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure. This is not a topic that Ukraine sought to place on the agenda. Yet it has become a standing agenda item by necessity, reflecting ongoing violations of the Agency’s Statute and of the resolutions adopted by both the Board of Governors and the General Conference. It is a reality imposed on all of us by acts of aggression that have undermined the very foundations of nuclear safety and the credibility of the international safeguards system.

Before the war, Ukraine’s nuclear sector was stable, predictable and fully transparent. Zaporizhzhia, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, was connected to the grid by ten independent power lines. Cooling water flowed reliably from the Kakhovka reservoir without interruption. The plant was staffed entirely by licensed professionals who regularly passed training and requalification. Safeguards were applied in full, with data transmitted seamlessly to the national regulator and inspectors enjoying unrestricted access. This was a system fully consistent with the IAEA’s seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety and security, and a standard of safety and accountability that Ukraine maintained for decades.

Today, as a result of Russian occupation, the same facility has been reduced to a fragile shadow of that standard. It has been forced for months to rely on a single external 750 kV power line for essential safety functions. On 4 July the plant again suffered a complete loss of off-site power and had to depend on emergency diesel generators for more than three hours. Since 2022 there have been nine such total blackouts. What was once a resilient network of ten connections is now a single point of failure.

Cooling water assurance has likewise deteriorated. The destruction of the Kakhovka dam caused the cooling pond to fall by more than three metres. Makeshift measures were introduced: an isolation dam to trap water in a channel, mobile pumps transferring water from the pond, and newly drilled wells to feed sprinkler ponds. These steps are not a substitute for the robust hydraulic system that existed before the war. The IAEA has not been permitted to fully inspect the new dam, preventing independent assessment of whether this fragile arrangement could withstand a shock.

Staffing has also suffered. Before the war, Zaporizhzhia was staffed entirely by Ukrainian operators working under a clear chain of regulatory authority and continuous training. Today, IAEA reports confirm the presence of personnel rotated in from the Russian Federation to supplement local staff. Operators work under pressure in an environment dominated by military formations. Access for the Agency is restricted or delayed. Data streams to the regulator are interrupted. Safety culture built on professionalism has been replaced by uncertainty, intimidation and improvisation.

The wider nuclear landscape in Ukraine has not been spared. At Rivne and South Ukraine, Agency teams report air-raid alarms and drone activity within monitoring zones, conditions that never existed before the war. At Chornobyl, the New Safe Confinement — a global symbol of long-term safety — was damaged by a drone strike in February — the first ever deliberate military damage to the Confinement since its completion. Emergency repairs are ongoing but the fact that a structure built to isolate past catastrophe has itself become a target underscores the recklessness of military attacks in the vicinity of nuclear sites.

The broader implications are equally concerning. What was once a facility operating in full compliance with international standards of nuclear safety has been transformed into a site sustained by temporary fixes, interrupted oversight and improvised staffing arrangements. The longer these abnormal conditions persist, the greater the risk of cumulative technical degradation — equipment left without timely maintenance, safety systems tested under war-time stress instead of routine inspection, and operators working under pressure rather than in an environment of professionalism and confidence. These factors together erode not only the safety of the plant itself but also the credibility of the global safeguards system, which relies on transparency and predictable access. Before the war there was no doubt that Ukraine’s nuclear programme was fully accountable and under strict regulatory control. Today that certainty has been replaced by opacity and risk. If accepted as a precedent, this situation would erode the integrity of the global non-proliferation and safeguards system.

Mr. President,

On 10 August 2025, a missile strike damaged Zaporizhzhia’s external emergency crisis center, a key element of the safety system. This facility was intended to enable rapid response to changes in radiation levels. Its destruction has made such response impossible, creating additional risks for personnel, the population and the environment, and is yet another proof of deliberate violations by Russia of all seven indispensable nuclear safety and security pillars and of the five principles on the protection of Zaporizhzhia.

Since the beginning of 2025, more than 549 violations of Ukrainian airspace have been recorded within the 30-kilometer observation zones around our nuclear power plants. Drones and missiles have flown directly over sanitary protection zones. Such incursions are deliberate acts that pose direct threats to operational safety. Debris and near-miss events endanger both personnel and equipment.

Repeated Russian attacks have systematically targeted Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure, including high-voltage transmission lines and substations critical to the safe operation of nuclear facilities. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, external power supply to Ukrainian nuclear power plants has been lost thirteen times as a result of Russian shelling. Each such incident constitutes a gross violation of international norms and a direct threat of a nuclear accident.

Despite all of this, Ukraine has preserved the integrity of its energy system and maintained its skilled workforce. Nuclear power continues to be a cornerstone of Ukraine’s energy stability and national security. Ukraine also continues to fully comply with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, maintaining all reporting, inspections and technical measures required by the IAEA, even under conditions of war. No other Member State has ever faced such systematic armed attacks on nuclear infrastructure while being expected to maintain full compliance with IAEA obligations — and Ukraine has done so.

Mr. President,

Throughout this time, Ukraine has fulfilled its obligations under nuclear safety, security and safeguards. Our operating plants and the Chornobyl site remain fully transparent and cooperate with the IAEA. What prevents the same assurance at Zaporizhzhia is the occupation itself. The way forward is not ambiguous. Power redundancy must be restored so that no nuclear facility is left to rely on a single external line. Water security must be verified by immediate IAEA access to the isolation dam and related systems, supported by independent technical audits. ISAMZ must have full freedom of movement and communications. Real-time data must flow without interruption to the national regulator. And military personnel and equipment must be withdrawn from the site and its surroundings to allow safety culture to recover.

In this spirit, Ukraine respectfully calls on all Member States to support and to vote in favour of the draft resolution under this agenda item on Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine. By adopting this text, the General Conference will reaffirm the indispensable role of the IAEA and translate impartial reporting into real measures that reduce risk for Ukraine, for our neighbours and for the international nuclear regime as a whole.

I thank you, Mr. President!