Mr. Chairperson,

I would like to thank the Swiss Chairpersonship for convening this Annual Security Review Conference and for its genuine efforts to ensure that our discussions address the broader security challenges that will shape the future of our region.

Regrettably, this ambition has not been fully shared by all participating States. Some appear more interested in creating security threats and challenges than in discussing how to ensure a comprehensive security.

Nevertheless, our Organisation must continue to look forward. The relevance of our discussions depends on our ability to address not only conventional security concerns, but also the threats that increasingly define modern wars.

Today, we are no longer discussing security. We are discussing insecurity.

Let’s not forget that Russia's full-scale invasion launched in 2022 was not the beginning of the war against Ukraine. Russia's aggression started in 2014 with the illegal occupation of Crimea and parts of Donetsк and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.

For more than twelve years, the Kremlin has pursued the same objective: the destruction of Ukrainian statehood, the suppression of Ukrainian identity and the denial of Ukrainians' right to exist as a sovereign political nation.

Having failed to achieve these objectives through military force, Russia increasingly relies on terror against civilians, attacks on critical infrastructure and the destruction of cultural and historical heritage.

Only two days ago, Russia launched one of the largest aerial attacks since the beginning of its full-scale invasion. More than 600 drones and dozens of missiles targeted Ukrainian cities. In Kyiv alone, residential buildings, energy infrastructure, educational and cultural institutions were damaged, including the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, the Oleksandr Dovzhenko National Film Studio, the Mystetskyi Arsenal cultural complex, and dozens of residential buildings.

At least five civilians were killed and dozens more injured in Kyiv. In Kharkiv, Russian forces deliberately conducted a double-tap strike against rescuers responding to an earlier attack. Similar attacks affected Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Mykolaiv and other regions of Ukraine.

Particularly revealing was not only the scale of the attack, but also the choice of targets.

For many years, the Russian Federation has cynically justified its aggression under the false pretext of defending Russian language, Orthodox Christianity, historical memory etc. We often hear how it regularly accuses others of distorting history and undermining so-called “traditional values”.

Yet among the targets of the latest strike was the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra – one of the most important Orthodox shrines in Eastern Europe and a UNESCO World Heritage Site.

Russia speaks constantly about historical memory. Yet every missile that strikes a church, a museum, a cultural monument or a film studio demonstrates that memory matters only when it serves political control.

These examples expose a simple reality.

What Russia cannot own, it seeks to control. What it cannot control, it seeks to destroy.

These attacks are not isolated incidents. They form part of a deliberate and systematic campaign aimed at terrorising civilians, destroying critical infrastructure and undermining the resilience of Ukrainian society.

More than four years after the launch of Russia's full-scale invasion and more than twelve years since the beginning of Russian aggression against Ukraine, the principal threat to security in the OSCE area remains unchanged.

Russia continues to violate every fundamental principle upon which this Organization was established.

At the same time, Russia's war has demonstrated that modern wars are fought not only with tanks, missiles, and artillery.

They are fought through cyberattacks, foreign information manipulation and interference, attacks against critical infrastructure, economic coercion, sabotage and the exploitation of emerging technologies.

They are also fought through the use of organised criminal networks in temporarily occupied territories, the forced imposition of occupation administrations, passportisation, the persecution of local populations, militarization of children, illegal conscription and the systematic destruction of independent information space.

Russia's aggression against Ukraine has also demonstrated how authoritarian regimes increasingly cooperate in undermining European security.

Belarus continues to provide political, military and logistical support for Russia's war and remains an important component of the broader security challenge facing our region.

At the same time, we continue to hear assurances that Belarus seeks peace and stability. Ukraine has learned to treat such assurances with caution.

Many of us in this room remember the months preceding Russia's full-scale invasion. We remember repeated statements that no attack was being prepared. We remember categorical denials that Russian troops concentrated near Ukraine's borders posed any threat.

We also remember how those assurances ended.

Today, when we hear statements that Belarus poses no danger and that military activities on its territory should not cause concern, we have every reason to assess such claims against facts rather than rhetoric.

The lesson of February 2022 is simple: security cannot be built on declarations alone. It must be built on actions.

The OSCE has encountered many of these challenges directly.

Today, three former SMM officials remain unlawfully imprisoned by the Russian Federation.

OSCE assets, including SMM vehicles and other equipment funded by participating States, remain illegally seized by Russia. Even after dismantling the Mission, Russia continues to hold hostage not only former OSCE personnel but also OSCE property itself.

These facts should serve as a reminder that attacks on Ukraine are also attacks on the credibility, principles and institutions of this Organization.

Russia's war has generated lessons that extend far beyond Ukraine.

It has demonstrated the need to strengthen resilience and ensure that international organisations remain capable of responding to rapidly changing realities.

If the OSCE is to remain relevant, it must continue adapting its toolbox to contemporary security challenges while remaining firmly anchored in the principles of the Helsinki Final Act.

Mr. Chair,

Ukraine did not choose this war. Yet Ukraine has become the frontline of many of the challenges that will shape the future security of our region.

What we experience today military aggression, cyberattacks, information manipulation, attacks on critical infrastructure and attempts to erase national identity, may tomorrow confront others.

The lessons of this war are written not only in military reports, but also in destroyed cities, damaged churches, silenced cultural institutions and stolen lives. The question before us is whether this Organization is prepared to learn those lessons.

I thank you, Mr. Chairperson.